We present a model for the dynamics of a population where the age distribution and the social structure are taken into account. This results in an integro-differential equation in which the kernel of the integral term may depend on a functional of the solution itself. We prove the well posedness of the problem with some regularity properties of the solution. Then, we consider some special cases and provide some simulations.
Introduction
Mathematical models to describe social phenomena have been proposed and studied in many contexts. Quite recently, some special attention has been focussed on the evolution of criminality in the society (see e.g. the workshops [1] and the special volume [2] where a great deal of references can be found [10] ).
Confining ourselves to models based on the methods of population dynamics, the society is described as composed by sub-populations (in the simplest case, the classical "triangle" model: criminals, guards, potential targets) mutually interacting and connected by fluxes of individuals (see e.g. [14] , [19] , [20] , [17] ). It is evident that more accurate models should take into account the quantities that influence e.g. the recruitment of criminals, or the effect and attractivity of crime 1 . In [16] and [15] one of such quantities was identified as the "social class". More specifically the population of law-abiding people is considered to be composed of n classes (of increasing wealth) and the rate of transition from each of these classes to the adjacent one is assumed to be linear and governed by suitable non-negative coefficients of "social promotion" α k and of "social relegation" β k , while the transition to a social class not adjacent is forbidden.
In this perspective if we consider for simplicity the case of a closed population in which there are no criminals, and denoting by u k (t), k = 1, . . . , n the number of individuals belonging to the k-th class, one has to study the following system of linear ordinary differential equations: u k (t) = α k−1 u k (t) − (α k + β k )u k (t) + β k+1 u k+1 (t), k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where we set conventionally u 0 (t) = u n+1 (t) = 0 and β 1 = α n = 0. In this case, if α k and β k are constant for any k, the stationary solution has to satisfŷ
and hence is uniquely determined once we impose the condition
where N is known once the initial conditions for the system (1) are prescribed. The system (1) has been studied (with or without the presence of other populations, criminals, guards, prisoners, etc) under different assumptions on the α's and the β's. These coefficients, that represent the "social mobility" of the society one is considering, are known to depend on several factors. For example in [11] it is stipulated that the mobility is increasing with the total dimension of the population -i.e. with N -whereas in [16] [15] the coefficients of social promotion and relegation are assumed to depend on the total wealth of the population, and in turn this quantity is supposed to be a linear combination of u k (t)
or, more generally it is assumed that it is the solution of an ordinary differential equation of the formẆ
where the first term on the r.h.s. represents the rate of wealth production and Ψ takes into account the expenses that the society has to face, according to a chosen budgetary policy.
A continuous model
Here we want to introduce a continuous model based on the following features:
(i) the influence of the age structure of the population is taken into account;
(ii) the social structure of the society is in the form of a distribution function n(x, a, t) satisfying suitable integrability conditions such that, at any time t and for any 0 ≤ a 1 < a 2 , 0 ≤ x 1 < x 2 x2 x1 a2 a1
n(x, a, t) dx da represents the number of the individuals having age between a 1 and a 2 and "wealth" Concerning (i), in [8] it has been pointed out that this is a crucial factor for the dynamics of crime. Indeed, for each crime there is a sort of "age window", and the influence of age in the dynamics of "recruitment" of criminals seems to be as important as the influence of social environment.
To take age dependence into account an alternative approach would be to consider also the age dependence in terms of compartmental models. It is well known that, as far as demography is concerned, this approach (Lefkovitich matrix) is extensively used (see e.g. [7] [12]). For its applications to social dynamics see [3] and [21] .
Assume that the wealth index x in the population can take values in [0, X] and let γ(x, y, a, t) :
be a piecewise continuous function denoting the rate of transition from x to y. Moreover, let µ(x, a, t) be the exit rate from the population (by death or emigration) at time t for individuals of age a and wealth x. Then the dynamics of the society in terms of the state variables is found to be expressed by
Equation (7) has to be complemented with initial condition
and by a condition on the birth rate that could be simply
or, more naturally, given in terms of the fertility of the population φ(x, a, t)
where (no sex distinction is made) it is assumed that the newborns have the same wealth index as the parents. It is clear that the dependence of the social mobility on the total dimension of the population and/or the total wealth can be expressed postulating that γ depends in a given way on N (t) and/or W (t) where
and where, in analogy with (4), (5) either
where Π(x, a, t) is a suitable weight function, or it is the solution of the O.D.E.
with Ψ ≥ 0 representing the global expense rate. From now on, we set X = 1 with no loss of generality. 3 Well-posedness of the problem As we pointed out in the previous sections, the aim of this paper is to present the model and to analyze its basic mathematical features rather than to study in detail the most general cases. Consequently, in this section we will confine ourselves to considering the case in which the dependence on age is neglected and the following simplified problem is studied.
Problem (P)
Let L 1 (0, 1) the Banach space of the class of equivalence of the Lebesgue integrable functions on the interval (0, 1) with the usual norm || · || 1 . Find a continuously differentiable function of
and the initial condition n(x, t = 0) = n 0 (x), where F (t, n) which is the time dependent nonlinear operator with values in L 1 (0, 1) acting on n in the following way
Here W is the linear operator depending on t ∈ [0, ∞] defined as
The assumptions on γ and θ will be listed later.
Remark 2. Age dependence introduces in general the additional complication
of the boundary condition for n(x, a, t) for a = 0. If the latter is simply given as a known function n 1 (x, t), the essential difference w.r.t. Problem (P) is the substitution on the l.h.s. of (14) of the operator ∂ ∂t by the directional derivative in the plane (a, t):
If the boundary equation is given in terms of the fertility of the population, the model becomes much more complicated and its analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
We list the assumptions we will use
and it is such that ess sup
|θ(x, t) − θ(x, t 1 )| < ε, |t − t 1 | < δ(ε) and a.e. x ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 3. In the present model n 0 , γ, θ are non-negative elements of the respective spaces, but the proofs we give do not require positivity assumptions.
We will see that n 0 , γ, θ non-negative imply n(x, t) non-negative too.
We state the theorem
Theorem 1. Under assumptions (17)-(23), problem (P) has one and only one solution.
Proof This proof follows the lines of the theory based on ε-approximated solutions (see [6] ).
We consider W as a map from L 1 (0, 1) in a suitable set of time dependent bounded real functions. Note that
The assumptions on W and γ assure continuity and boundedness of the map
for any f ∈ L 1 (0, 1) such that it belongs to the closed bounded subset {f : ||f || 1 ≤ L} = B(0, L). Therefore one can state that it exists a function of t with values in L 1 (0, 1), let it be φ, such that it is continuous and has a piecewise continuous derivative in a suitable neighborhood of t = 0, and that it is (t,
Moreover the assumptions imply
and consequently if f,
, the truth of the estimate
This inequality imply that two ε 1 and ε 2 -approximated solutions to equation (14) , corresponding to the initial values f (·, 0) and f 1 (·, 0) are such that
Here k is the Lipschitz constant of F in the ball B(0, L).
Consequently (see Th. 1.6.1 and 1.7.1 of [6] ) existence and uniqueness of the solution of problem (P) can be proved in a suitable bounded closed interval
The fact that the integral of the r.h.s. in (15)
for any t ≥ 0 in the time interval of existence of the solution, for any n 0 ∈ L 1 (0, 1), assure that the solution can be extended to the interval [0, ∞). [4] , [5] ). Even if proofs are given there for autonomous equations, a careful reader can modify and fit them to many non autonomous problems. For instance, the case γ and θ independent of t is well described by the theory exposed in section 3.4 and/or 5.4 of [4] , and in chapter 3 of [5] .
Remark 4. The solution is such that
1 0 n(x, t) dx = 1 0 n 0 (x) dx, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀n 0 ∈ L 1 (0, 1).(29
Some remarks on the regularity of the solution
We begin by considering the simplest evolution model n t (x, t) = −n(x, t) 
Proof
By formal differentiation of (30) w.r.t. x we obtain the Cauchy problem
where n(x, t) is the known solution of (30). Such a problem has a unique solution, which is continuous, with a continuous t-derivative and that coincides necessarily with n x . Its explicit expression is
where
and S(x, y) denotes the free term in (31). Under the differentiability assumptions on n 0 (x), γ(x, y) the procedure can be iterated to calculate ∂ 
From Theorem 1 we already know that n t exists and is continuous in t for x a.e. in (0, 1). Moreover we can write
The function η(x, t) satisfying the Cauchy problem
which coincides with the original problem for n with the only change of the initial data, necessarily coincides with n t . Not only it exists, but has the derivative ∂ 2 t n continuous in t. Next we can calculate the initial value of
and iterate the procedure infinitely many times. In the particular case in which the initial distribution n 0 (x) is bounded we can say more.
Theorem 4.
If ess sup Ω n 0 (x) ≤ A 0 the function n(x, t) is analytic with respect to t, a.e in x.
Proof
Besides the function g(x) we define h(x) = 1 0 γ(y, x) dy, and we denote bŷ g andĥ the L ∞ norm of g, h. From (34) we deduce that |n 1 | ≤ A 0 (ĝ +ĥ), and from (38) that |n 2 | ≤ A 0 (ĝ +ĥ) 2 , and so on. Thus we have the estimates
showing that n(x, t) has a uniformly convergent Taylor expansion for t ≥ 0, a.e. in x. Moreover, we have the estimates
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 were proved in the case (30) i.e. when social mobility does not depend on the total wealth W (t).
For the more complicated model
the argument for the differentiability of n w.r.t. x goes exactly as in the prof of Theorem 2. Proving higher-order differentiability w.r.t. t is still possible but estimates of the kind (39) cannot be obtained.
Some particular cases
This section will be devoted to the analysis of some qualitative properties of the solution of problem (P). To be specific we will consider first the case Windependent that is not so far from the concrete situation 3 . Then we will discuss a case of uniform promotion/relegation depending on W .
The scheme of the session is the following. 
We consider the case in which γ has constant values in the regions

Constant social promotion and relegation
then equation (14) gives
Since (44) can be rewritten
integrating with respect to x and setting
we have
Therefore we find the explicit solution
(49) In particular if ab = 0 the equilibrium solution is
If a or b vanishes, the solution tends asymptotically to concentrate in x = 0 or x = 1 respectively. We note that, with some additional work, the analogous of (50) can be found also in cases on which γ has constant values in subsets of A and B.
Dependence on just one variable in A and B
We have four cases
We can find the explicit equilibrium solution in each of the four cases. In case (51) we find
whence n ∞ (x) is found by differentiation.
In case (54) we set
and we find
where n ∞ (0) has to be found by imposing
Finally, we find
(59) In cases (52) and (53) the calculations are more lengthy and we give just the final result.
For case (52) we have
For case (53) we define
5.3 The symmetric case γ(x, y) = γ(y, x)
It is immediately verified that in this case we have the constant equilibrium solution
The case of factorized kernel γ(x, y) = p(x)q(y)
In the particular case p = 1 equation (14) can be written
Hence
having the asymptotic profile
In the general factorized case, defining
we find that the equilibrium solution n ∞ has to satisfỹ
Hence n ∞ is given by
where K is found by imposing that
Of course, we excluded the possibility that p(x) = 0 for somex. But this fact would mean that there is no possibility of leaving the statex, whereas (if q(x) = 0) there is a finite rate of "arrival" inx from other states. Of course, ifx is the unique zero of p(x) the final situation would be n ∞ (x) = N δ(x −x) where δ is the Dirac's delta.
We also note that this result still holds if γ is allowed to depend on W in a factorized form
Indeed, looking for a stationary solution of (14) Φ(W ) cancels and we are back to the previous case.
Uniform promotion/relegation rates, depending on W .
Let us go back to the case examined in Sect 5.1, but letting a,b depend on W . Thus we assume
with a, b continuous and positive for W ∈ [0, N ||θ||], and we look for a steady state solution 4 From Sect. 5.1 we know that if n ∞ (x) is such a solution, then
where W ∞ is the wealth index corresponding to n ∞ (x), namely
In the following it will be convenient to define
Thus equation (78) can be written as
Imposing (79) we conclude that steady state solutions correspond to the roots of the algebraic equation
Of course (81) has one unique solution for any θ(x) in the particular case in which a and b are proportional, while (81) is identically satisfied for ω = N K 0 when θ = K 0 . We will consider with some more detail the case
which is, in some sense, the most natural way of associating the wealth index to the produced wealth W . We define the function
The function F (H) is plotted in Fig. (1) and can be made C 1 by defining To be specific we consider the following example
so that
and we rewrite (81) as
where W −1 (H) is the inverse of the function H(W ) and when H is not invertible we mean one branch of its inverse graph.
In the example we are considering we have two branches
both defined for H > H min = 4 Kλ 2 N 2 and such that 
In the first case the branch Ω 1 gives a finite solution, while the branch Ω 2 may have no finite intersection with the graph of F (H). However it does provide the solution Ω = 0 (intersection at infinity). This is related (as we have remarked in Sect. 5.1) with the fact that a(0) = 0.
In the second case we lose the intersection of the first branch, but a finite intersection will exist with the second branch, since F (H) decays at infinity as ln H H , while Ω 2 decays like 1 KHλ 2 N 2 . The intersection at infinity still exists. 
Some simulations
In this section we will display some numerical simulations that have the sole aim of showing how the model -once calibrated on data taken from some concrete situation -can give some ideas on the social dynamics. It is commonly accepted that the policy of a society should tend to increase the total wealth, preserving at the same time some equity.
To measure the latter quantity, several indexes have been proposed. One of them is based on the so-called Lorenz curve [13] . In our model it is the curve that expresses the quantity R(x) = x 0 ξn(ξ) dξ/W with respect to M (x) = x 0 n(ξ) dξ/N . The Gini index (see [9] ) is defined as the double of the area between the It is a number ranging from 0 (total "equity": a limit case in which all the individuals have the same individual wealth) to 1 (a limit case in which one has two subpopulations of wealth 0 and of wealth 1).
Another possibility of measuring the equity is the fraction of the total wealth that is in the hands -say -the richest 25% of the population: in our notation ρ = 1 − R(0.75).
Just to have an idea of the dynamics, we have considered the social mobility of our societies defined as follows γ(x, y) = exp − −(x − y) It can be observed that the total wealth W decreases and that the index ρ, after a rapid increase, keeps decreasing. It means that there is more equity but the society is less productive. In fig. (3) we assumed that the terms expressing social promotion (x < y) and social relegation (x > y) are affected by the total wealth and by the policy chosen as a consequence of it. More specifically we assumed 
Here the evolution of the society is favorable: W increases, while the index ρ actually stabilizes to a rather large value. This is the effect of creating welfare of the middle class (see the peak in panel a).
